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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Massachusetts v. EPA, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 3785
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a narrowly divided 5-4 decision,
that (1) states have standing to sue the Environmental Protection Agency
for not taking appropriate steps in protecting them from climate change
and (2) that this agency has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases as
"air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act.
Petitioners, a group of local environmental organizations
(including Sierra Club, Green Peace, and Friends of the Earth) and several
state governments, brought an action alleging that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") were failing to enforce § 202 the Clean Air
Act ("CAA") and needed to begin regulating several types of greenhouse
gasses, including carbon dioxide, which allegedly contributed to global
warming. The EPA, backed by several states and some trade unions,
argued that (1) the Clean Air Act did not authorize the EPA to address
global climate change and that (2) it would be unwise at this time to begin
setting up greenhouse gas emission standards.
The U.S. Supreme Court first held that petitioners had standing to
challenge the EPA's denial of their rulemaking petition under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. The Court's majority recognized that states were not
normal petitioners and therefore the standard rules did not apply to them.
Further, the Court held that the EPA's refusal to regulate these emissions
presented an actual and imminent risk of harm to the state of
Massachusetts. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, agreed with the
petitioners that the rising global sea levels that have eaten away millions
of dollars of the Massachusetts coastline represented a real and concrete
harm to the state, that global warming and climate change was the cause of
this, and that the appropriate remedy would be to force the EPA to
regulate the carbon dioxide emissions and thereby slow down this process.
Turning to the second question, the Court dismissed the EPA's
argument that carbon dioxide is not an "air pollutant" within the meaning
of the provision, and held that § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes
the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in
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the event that it forms a "judgment" that such emissions contribute to
climate change. Essentially the majority concluded that if the EPA made a
finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act required them to regulate
these emissions as pollutants.
Moreover, the majority dismissed the EPA's opinion that, even if it
did have the statutory authority to regulate emissions, it would be unwise
to do so. While 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) does allow the EPA to decide this
issue on the formation of its judgment, the majority held that the EPA had
not put forward any reasonable explanation for its refusal to decide
whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate change. Because of this
refusal, the EPA's actions were "arbitrary and capricious" and therefore
not in accordance with the law.
In a stem dissent, Chief Justice Roberts declared these claims
nonjusticiable and stated that these issues were issues for Congress and the
executive branch to remedy. Roberts rebuked the majority's decision
recognizing states as having special standing as litigants claiming there
was no Congressional or common law backing for this decision. Further,
the Chief Justice claimed that the majority relied on faulty science and
conjecture in its conclusion that climate change was affecting
Massachusetts.
In another dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia vociferously argued that
there was nothing in the original statutes that required the EPA to regulate
these emissions and that by forcing the EPA's hand, the Court was setting
a dangerous precedent for the future. Finally, Scalia concluded by
declaring this case a simple administrative law case and claiming that the
Court had no business injecting its opinion for the judgment of the agency.
ELIJAH J. L. HAAHR
576
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 1397 (2007)
Rockwell International Corporation appealed a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which held that a qui
tam relator was an "original source" under the False Claims Act ("FCA"),
and the United States Supreme Court reversed.
Rockwell operated under a management and operating contract
with the Department of Energy ("DOE") between 1975 and 1989 to run a
nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. In the early 1980s, Rockwell
investigated the possibility of disposing of the toxic pond sludge which the
weapons plant accumulated in its solar evaporation ponds by mixing the
sludge with cement. The hardened cement-sludge mixture ("pondcrete")
either would be stored at the weapons plant or be transported to other sites
for storage.
One of Rockwell's engineers, James Stone, reviewed a proposed
methodology for making "pondcrete" in 1982 and concluded that the
proposal would not work, believing that the proposed process would make
an unstable mixture that would eventually deteriorate and release harmful
chemicals into the environment. Nevertheless, Rockwell initiated its
"pondcrete" program and started making "pondcrete" at the weapons
plant. Shortly after Stone was laid off in 1986, Rockwell discovered that
"pondcrete" blocks were not as solid as originally thought. Although
Rockwell knew of the problem with the "pondcrete" blocks as early as
October 1986, DOE did not learn about the problem until May 1988, when
several "pondcrete" blocks started leaking harmful chemicals.
In 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act
("FCA") (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733) for, among other things, violations of
RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6928; 18 U.S.C. § 1001). At the same time that he
filed his suit in federal court, Stone also delivered to the federal
government a confidential disclosure statement that described all the
evidence and materials that he had in his possession; the statement
identified twenty-six environmental and safety issues but only one
involved the "pondcrete."
Rockwell moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, because they claimed that Stone was not an "original
source" as required to file a qui tam suit under the FCA. The District
Court denied the motion because it was satisfied that Stone had the direct
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and independent knowledge that Rockwell's compensation for running the
weapons plant was linked to its compliance with environmental, health,
and safety regulations, and that he also had direct and independent
knowledge that Rockwell allegedly concealed deficient performance to
continue receiving compensation.
In amended pleadings after the federal government was allowed to
intervene in the suit, Stone alleged that Rockwell replaced its "pondcrete"
foreman and that the new foreman increased "pondcrete" production rates
by reducing the cement-to-sludge ratio. Stone further alleged that the
newer ratio was a major reason why the "pondcrete" blocks were falling
apart. The pleadings did not mention any of the problems that Stone had
identified in 1982.
At trial, Stone relied on the new allegations to the exclusion of the
1982 allegations. When Rockwell filed a motion to dismiss after the jury
found in favor of Stone, Stone acknowledged that his claims were based
on publicly disclosed allegations but maintained that he was an original
source. The district court agreed with Stone, but the Tenth Circuit
remanded the case on appeal, instructing the district court to determine if
Stone had disclosed his information to the Government before filing the
qui tam suit.
The district court held that Stone had not sufficiently
communicated his allegations and had also failed to establish that he orally
informed the FBI about his allegations before filing his lawsuit. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the 1982 report was
enough to carry Stone's burden of persuasion. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the issue was whether Stone was an original source, and thus able
to sue Rockwell for violations of RCRA and other environmental laws,
when Stone's successful claims were based upon publicly disclosed
allegations. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that Stone was not
an original source under the FCA and thus could not sue as a qui tam
relator.
The Court first addressed the meaning of "direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based" in the
part of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), which allows qui tam suits;
specifically the Court had to decide if the phrase applied to the relator's
allegations or those allegations which were publicly disclosed. The Court
reasoned that the phrase must refer to the relator's allegations and not the
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publicly disclosed ones, and then also noted that the phrase does not
merely apply to statements in an initial pleading to a court but also to
amended pleadings.
Next, applying its interpretation of the FCA, the Court held that
Stone was not an original source. Because the only claims ultimately
found by the jury were false statements respecting health, safety, and
environmental compliance between April 1987 and September 1988, and
Stone only claimed to have direct and independent knowledge about in-
solid "pondcrete" during that time, and because Stone was not employed
at Rockwell at that time, the Court said that Stone actually didn't know
that the "pondcrete" was not solid or leaking chemicals at the time.
Furthermore, the Court said that, during that time, Stone also did
not know the "pondcrete" blocks were subject to RCRA or that Rockwell
would not remedy the problems in the blocks. Thus, Stone lacked the
direct and independent knowledge that the FCA required for him to be
able to pursue a qui tam lawsuit against Rockwell. The Court concluded
by ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Stone's case, but
left intact the federal government's claims.
JoHN H.A. GRIESEDIECK
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Coliseum Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Jackson 465 F. 3d 215, (5th Cir. 2006)
In Coliseum Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Jackson, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed several claims made by a number of New Orleans
Community organizations against the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The plaintiffs argued that it
was essential for HUD to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for a New Orleans, LA housing project.
The plaintiffs argued that because the EIS was essential to the
project, HUD was not in compliance with NEPA and all federal funding
for the project should cease until the project came into compliance. HUD,
by issuing a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI") determined that
the procedures it used to determine if an EIS was required for the project
were sound procedures and that an EIS was not essential to this project nor
was it required. The plaintiffs asked the courts to enter a declaratory
judgment that HUD failed to comply with the statutes in funding the St.
Thomas Housing Development Revitalization Project ("development
project") and to compel HUD to withhold funds from the project until it
fully complied.
The development project that received funding from HUD was a
plan to demolish the preexisting St. Thomas Housing Development ("St.
Thomas") in New Orleans. St. Thomas was a residential housing project
built between 1937 and 1949. About forty-five years after the construction
of the St. Thomas projects they were run down and "crime ridden." In
1996, HUD granted HANO a $25 Million grant through the HOPE IV
program for the revitalization of the St. Thomas projects. When the grant
for the project was approved by HUD, the revitalization was limited to
residential housing. The project eventually provided for construction of
new low income housing, new market rate housing, a senior care facility,
and a retail shopping center.
In July 2001, after the environmental assessment ("EA") was
complete, the private developer which the government hired
recommended that the retail space be scaled back from 275,000 to 199,000
square feet and that a Wal-Mart store fill the space.
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HUD reopened the previously signed memorandum of
understanding and expanded its environmental assessment to include
specifically the impact that Wal-Mart would have on historic properties in
the area and the environment. HUD believed that all of the NEPA
requirements would be met and that the project could go forward in
compliance with the statute. HUD never performed an environmental
impact statement. In February 2003, an amended Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") was signed and a new environmental assessment and
FONSI was issued.
The court addressed the plaintiffs' arguments by applying the
"arbitrary and capricious" or "clearly contrary to law" standard which
placed a huge obstacle in the plaintiffs' path. The plaintiffs were not able
to produce enough evidence to overcome this standard on any of their
claims. The court applied this standard to the several arguments the
plaintiffs raised in support of their contention that HUD's funding of the
housing project violated NEPA.
One of the more colorful arguments the plaintiffs raised is the
argument that HUD's consideration of the project's environmental justice
impacts was arbitrary and capricious. Essentially, the plaintiffs had to
prove that HUD was arbitrary and capricious in its examination of what
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects the St. Thomas project would have on low-income or minority
populations. The court looked to HUD's administrative record and noted
that the agency considered many environmental justice concerns in
making its decision not to prepare an EIS. Because the record proved that
HUD gave consideration to the environmental justice concerns, the
plaintiffs were not able to prove that HUD acted arbitrarily or capriciously
in its consideration of these concerns.
The court held that because HUD had not acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or contrary to law in its study, consideration, and findings
regarding the project's environmental and historical impact, it was not
required by NEPA or NHPA to cease federal funding of the project.
KRISTOL L. WHATLEY
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Lombardi v. Whitman, 2007 WL 1148709 (2nd Cir. 2007)
In late November 2004, five New York search and rescue workers
who had participated in post-9/11 clean up efforts brought a Bivens
substantive due process action against current and former federal officials
alleging that these officials knowingly made false and misleading
statements regarding the air quality of the lower Manhattan clean up site.
A Bivens action is a qualifed immunity doctrine that allows a plaintiff to
bring suit against government officials in their individual capacities when
the plaintiff s constitutional rights have been allegedly violated.
The plaintiffs argued that press releases and public statements
issued by officials of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
White House Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), and
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") led the workers
to believe that the air-quality was at a level safe enough for them to work
with little or no respiratory equipment and, as a result, these workers
suffered or reasonably feared suffering illness or injury caused by
exposure to harmful substances contaminating the clean up site.
As part of their case, the plaintiffs offered into evidence an internal
EPA report from the Inspector General criticizing the EPA Office's
response to the events of September 11th. Among other things, the report
noted that despite test results indicating potentially harmful levels of
asbestos, EPA officials issued statements that the air quality levels in
Lower Manhattan were safe and assured that search and rescue workers
would receive adequate equipment.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
holding that the workers had not established a violation of their
constitutional rights. Alternatively, the court held that even if such a
violation had been established, the defendants possessed qualified
immunity given that the right allegedly violated was not clearly
established at the time of their conduct. Two of the plaintiffs were
individually dismissed because one could not bring a valid Bivens action
for injuries sustained during military service, and the other was already
eligible for compensation as a U.S. Marshal under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act.
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The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals which affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals
rejected the workers' substantive due process claim that the government
had failed to protect or warn them of a known risk of bodily harm on the
ground that failure to warn is not the type of affirmative act that amounts
to a substantive due process violation.
The court also rejected the workers' claim that the government
created the danger and the resulting harm was a direct cause of the
workers' detrimental reliance on the government's assurances of safe
working conditions. On this claim, the court's decision turned on the issue
of whether the defendants' actions rose to a conscience-shocking level;
therefore, the court never reached the issues of whether the officials
violated clearly established law or whether the plaintiffs had properly
raised a Bivens cause of action.
In order for a plaintiff to successfully plead this type of substantive
due process violation, the plaintiff must show that he or she received a
false sense of security from the government's intentional
misrepresentation, bodily harm directly resulted, and the government
action in question shocks the conscience. The standard under which the
Court of Appeals analyzed whether the officials' actions rose to a
conscience-shocking level was whether their actions were egregious or
outrageous. The court determined that because the defendants' press
releases and statements were not intentionally misleading but were issued
pursuant to the EPA's duty to supply the public with essential health
information, the officials' conduct was not so egregious or outrageous as
to shock the conscience. Because the conduct did not rise to the
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Mayo Foundation v. Surface Transportation Board, 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir.
Dec. 28, 2006)
A group of plaintiffs challenged the decision of the Surface
Transportation Board ("the Board"), which approved a proposal by the
Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corporation ("DM&E") to
construct approximately 280 miles of new rail line to the coal mines of
Powder River Basin, Wyoming and to upgrade 600 miles of rails in
Minnesota and South Dakota. The plaintiffs contended that approval for
the project violated 49 U.S.C. § 109001 and the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"). The court first held that because the Board's
rejection of the sound insulation treatments was not arbitrary and
capricious, the Board's decision was adequate. The court held that because
the Surface Transportation Board adequately considered the "reasonably
foreseeable significant adverse effects [of increased coal consumption] on
the human environment," the board's decision was appropriate.
Before DM&E could begin construction on the new rail line it was
required by federal statute to seek approval from the Board. NEPA
requires that the Board evaluate the environmental impact of the project
because the approval is "a major Federal action[] significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." In order to comply with NEPA,
the Board prepared both a draft and a final environmental impact
statement. The environmental impact statements examined the effects of
the proposal, taking into account 147 conditions imposed by the Board to
mitigate adverse environmental effects.
In a prior challenge to the proposal, the Eighth Circuit remanded
the case to the Board to further consider the decision not to impose
mitigating conditions for horn noise and to consider the possible
environmental effects of increased coal consumption due to the
availability of shorter and cheaper rail routes for coal distribution. On
remand, the Board issued a draft and final supplemental environmental
impact statement, and it approved the project based on the analysis in the
supplemental environmental impact statement. The Board again imposed
the original 147 mitigating factors, which included a modification to one
of the conditions that would require DM&E to assist communities in
establishing and funding quiet zones.
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The Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board's compliance with NEPA
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and its standard of
setting aside agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." The plaintiffs argued
that the Board's decision not to impose the cost of quiet zones on DM&E
was arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to consider the cost
of the noise mitigation measures in the context of the total cost of the
project.
The court ultimately found that because the Board had found that
sound walls could pose safety risks to motorists, might not be effective,
and posed substantial costs, the Board's decision was not arbitrary and
capricious. The plaintiffs also argued that the Board failed to adequately
consider the environmental impact of increased coal consumption in the
area due to the ease of access with the construction of the new rail line.
The Eighth Circuit held that because the Board took into account a
national study that considered the effects of increased coal consumption
and recognized that there was no study that took into account local effects
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United States v. Cooper, 2007 WL 914314 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007)
On April 28, 2005, a jury convicted D.J. Cooper for knowingly
discharging pollutants into the waters of the United States in violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Cooper operated a sewage lagoon at his
trailer park since 1967 under a permit issued by the Virginia Department
of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). The lagoon served as a reservoir,
which allowed solid waste to settle on the bottom and fluid to overflow
into a treatment system. After the fluid was passed through a chlorination
process, it was discharged into a small nearby creek. Cooper's permit
required him to sample the discharged water each month and report the
results, so the DEQ could ensure that the discharge was not exceeding
limitations set for various pollutants.
From 1993 to 1998, the DEQ found that Cooper had violated is
permit over 300 times. The DEQ fined Cooper $5,000 and gave him until
August 2000 to perform remedial action pursuant to a Consent Order. The
Consent Order gave him the option to "upgrade[e] the lagoon, replac[e]
the lagoon with a self-contained treatment plant or septic field, or clos[e]
the trailer lots served by the lagoon." Cooper failed to comply, continued
to discharge sewage containing pollutants above allowable regulatory
levels, and by August 2000, the DEQ fined him another $2,000 in
violation of the Consent Order. The DEQ gave him a second chance to
remedy his actions by August 2002. The permit violations continued, and
when Cooper failed to complete the remedial actions, he was notified that
his permit was revoked. By 2003, the EPA investigated Cooper for
criminal violations of the CWA, and on October 21, 2004, he was
indicted.
Cooper's main point on appeal was that the government failed to
prove that he knowingly discharged the pollutants into waters of the
United States. His argument suggested that the term "knowingly" applied
not only to his actions discharging pollutants, but also to his knowledge
that discharge occurred in streams of the United States. The Court rejected
this argument by noting, "mens rea requirements typically do not extend to
jurisdictional elements of a crime." Thus, Cooper did not need to "know"
that he was discharging pollutants into waters of the United States in order
to be hauled into federal court for violation of the Clean Water Act. The
Court compared this to felons transporting firearms across state lines or
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knowledge that a murder victim is a federal officer. In both cases, courts
impose federal jurisdiction regardless of whether the defendant knows the
crime is a federal crime.
Finally, the court examined the legislative intent of the CWA. The
Court concluded that Congress intended to afford the nation's waterways
protection to the fullest extent possible. Moreover, Congress would not be
able to deter criminal activity if a conviction imposed a burden on the state
to prove a defendant's knowledge of jurisdictional facts.
The court simply needed to prove that Cooper knowingly
discharged sewage into the nearby stream in violation of the CWA, which
it sufficiently did. The district court's order for Cooper to serve 27 months
imprisonment and pay a total fine of $270,000 was affirmed.
RYAN WESTHOFF
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STATE COURTS
Putnam County Nat'1 Bank v. City of New York, 37 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007)
In 1995, Putnam County National Bank ("Bank") acquired title to
an undeveloped parcel of real estate in the Town of Carmel in Putnam
County, New York. The Town of Carmel and the Putnam County Board of
Health approved a plan for the subdivision of the parcel into 36 lots, and
the State of New York issued a water pollution discharge permit allowing
the operation of a central sewage system for the subdivision. However, the
New York City Department of Environmental Protection determined that
the central sewer system could not be constructed in compliance with the
City's Watershed Regulations. Therefore, the State-issued water pollution
discharge permit allowing operation of the central sewage system on the
property was revoked.
The Bank then obtained approval of an alternative plan, under
which the parcel would be developed as a 17-lot subdivision using
subsurface septic systems. In 2003, the Bank sold the property for more
than $1.4 million, which it alleged was approximately 20% of the value it
would have realized had the parcel been approved for development as a
36-lot subdivision with a central sewer system. The Bank then sued the
City of New York alleging that the enforcement of the Watershed
Regulations was an unconstitutional taking of its property without just
compensation. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Bank
appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and first
explained that a land use regulation may diminish the value of private
property without resulting in a compensable taking. Such regulations are
not unconstitutional merely because they cause the property's value to be
substantially reduced, or because they deprive the property of its most
beneficial use. Instead, the constitutionality of a regulation is determined
under a balancing test which considers the economic impact of the
regulation, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action. Also, the court explained that the property owner must
show that under no permissible use would the parcel as a whole be capable
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of producing a reasonable return upon enforcement of the challenged
regulation.
The court noted that the Bank's property was approved for
residential development after enactment of the Watershed Regulations,
and that the Bank failed to prove that it did not receive a reasonable return
upon its sale of the property for $1.4 million. In addition, the court stated
that the alleged economic impact on the Bank was insufficient as a matter
of law to outweigh the substantial public interest in the City's enforcement
of the Watershed Regulations. Therefore, the court held that the motion to
dismiss was properly granted.
DARRYL CHATMAN
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City of Bridgeton v. Missouri-American Water Co., -- S.W.3d --, 2007
WL 1121807 (Mo.)
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed when right of passage
contracts involving a public utility require that utility to pay the cost of
moving facilities when the city alters areas for a public purpose. Under the
facts of the case, the city of Bridgeton ("Bridgeton"), located outside St.
Louis City, approved the application of TRiSTAR Business Communities,
LLC ("TRiSTAR") to create a new 1-370 exit in exchange for TRiSTAR's
financial assistance in improving Taussig Road. The changes to Taussig
Road would require the movement of water facilities owned by Missouri-
American Water Company ("Missouri-American"). Missouri-American
refused to relocate the facilities without payment of more than $500,000.
The city council then passed a resolution stating the public safety and
interest in the road improvements. The council gave the mayor rights to
advance such improvements by any lawful means, including the
revocation of licensing. Bridgeton then filed a trespass suit against
Missouri-American to have the pipes removed.
Missouri-American's predecessor first received a franchise right to
service the area currently covered by Taussig Road in 1902. At that time,
the land was governed by St. Louis County. After Bridgeton annexed the
land in 1951, the city passed a twenty year franchise to Missouri-
American's predecessor. The twenty year franchise was not renewed but
both the city and the company continued the relationship as if it had been
renewed.
In 1967, Missouri-American's predecessor executed a license with
a railway, whose land was later sold to Bridgeton. This land was adjacent
to Taussig Road and not covered by the former agreements. The license
provided that Missouri-American would pay for any relocation of pipes or
facilities to accommodate changes in the land. The court addressed the
rights to maintain pipes created by the agreements and the rights regarding
the cost of relocation. Bridgeton also owned land known as Parcels 21 and
22 that were not covered by any agreement with Missouri-American or its
predecessors.
Regarding the land surrounding Taussig Road under the 1902 and
1951 agreements, the court found that the change in ownership through
annexation cancelled the effects of the 1902 agreement. The 1951
590
agreement then controlled. Under law governing a contract with a
durational limit, once the twenty year time has passed, both parties have a
right to withdraw from the provided duties and privileges. However, when
both parties continue to operate without change, there is an implied
contract that may be cancelled on reasonable notice under the terms of the
franchise ordinance.
Since both parties maintained the franchise-type relationship and
Bridgeton expressed a desire to have the pipes moved rather than the
relationship cancelled, the court found Missouri-American has authority to
maintain the pipes in the Taussig Road right of way. Although the
franchise agreement did not address the cost of relocation, Union Electric
Co. v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of St. Louis, 555 S.W.
2d 29 (Mo. Banc 1977), stated that a utility company must relocate at its
own expense when changes are required for pubic convenience, safety or
necessity. The court discarded the timing issues as irrelevant and found the
city council noted that the Taussig Road improvements were for public
safety. Therefore, Missouri-American was responsible for the relocation of
facilities in the Taussig Road right of way.
The court found that Missouri-American also had a duty to pay the
relocation of facilities in the adjacent area formerly owned by the railway.
This duty is derived from the licensing agreement which specifically
bound the successors and assigns of the railway. The agreement
specifically contained a cost provision to accommodate changes in the
land. The issue regarding Parcels 21 and 22 was less certain. Because of a
lack of support provided by Missouri-American in its brief, the court
accepted statements that Bridgeton owned the land and the land was free
from any franchise, easement, or license. Thus, the court found the record
to be insufficient to establish that Missouri-American was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law with respect to Parcels 21 and 22.
ANNA Ross
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Meyer v. Fluor Corporation, 2007 Mo. LEXIS 41 (2007)
The Fluor Corporation, along with other entities and individuals,
were involved with a lead smelter in Herculaneum, Missouri. The smelter
emitted large quantities of lead and other toxins into the environment each
year. In this case, there was no dispute over the following facts: that the
lead was toxic, children are more susceptible to injury from lead poisoning
than adults, injuries from lead exposure often present themselves in latent
form in that injuries are not immediately apparent, and years may pass
before symptoms are discovered.
The plaintiff in this case, a minor child, filed suit against Fluor
claiming to be a member of a class of children in and around Herculaneum
exposed to toxic emissions from the smelter. The proposed class consisted
of over 200 children. The plaintiff alleged negligence, strict liability,
private nuisance, and trespass. Based on these allegations, the plaintiff
sought compensatory damages to establish a medical monitoring program
for the class members. The circuit court, however, denied class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.08. On appeal, the
plaintiff claimed that the circuit court erred in assuming that present
physical injury was a necessary element of a medical monitoring claim.
Rule 52.08(a) has four prerequisites: the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; there must be
questions of law or fact common to the class; the claims or defenses of the
representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and the representative parties must be able to fairly and adequately
protect the class' interest. After one of the four prerequisites of 52.08(a) is
met, the class action can be maintained only if the class satisfies one of the
three requirements of Rule 52.08(b). In the case at bar, the plaintiff sought
certification under 52.08(b)(3), which requires a finding that the question
of law or fact common to the class is predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
matter.
Medical monitoring is common in toxic tort cases, where physical
injury and illness is often latent and not discoverable or diagnosable for
months or even years after the exposure. A medical monitoring claim
seeks recovery for the costs of future periodic diagnostic testing to detect
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the latent injuries that develop from exposure to toxic substances. Some
courts, Missouri not included, have recognized such medical monitoring
claims because of the significant economic and physical harm that befalls
someone exposed to toxic substances. Missouri is clear, however, that
plaintiffs are entitled to recovery for the prospective consequences of a
defendant's tortious conduct if the injury is "reasonably certain to occur."
The defendants in this case contended that any recovery for
medical monitoring is contingent upon the existence of a present physical
injury. While some courts follow that reasoning, the Missouri Supreme
Court found a present physical injury requirement inconsistent with tort
recovery. Because of the latent nature of injuries related to toxic substance
exposure, having a present physical injury requirement destroys the tort
claim and bars the plaintiff from a full recovery. Despite the fact that a
plaintiff may not yet have a diagnosable physical injury, it is inaccurate to
conclude that the plaintiff has not suffered any compensable injury.
Further, the plaintiff is entitled to be fully compensated for any of the
defendant's wrongs, which may include paying for periodic examinations
to determine if any physical injury or illness exists. Therefore, the
Missouri Supreme Court found that class certification was wrongly denied
in this case because the circuit court's reasoning was premised on a
present physical injury requirement, which is relevant for personal injury
claims, but need not be met in medical monitoring cases.
AMANDA K. WOLF
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